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 The Polis Falling Apart: Aineias Tacticus and Stasis 
Maria Pretzler 
 
“Stasis – civil strife – is worse than war to the same degree as war is worse than 
peace.”1 Aineias may have agreed with Herodotos’ general sentiment about the terrifying 
nature of conflict within a community, particularly because it had such a potential to increase 
the risks of war, but in the Poliorketika, there are no neat distinctions between conflict inside 
the polis and outside aggression. In fact, the term stasis is never used in the work, but it will 
be used in this chapter as a shorthand for various symptoms of internal disunity which 
Aineias clearly identifies as a serious threat to his city under siege. Traitors inside the city can 
inspire or invite outside attack, sabotage defence efforts, and finally open the gates to bring 
about utter defeat; at the same time, the pressures of war are also likely to cause new tensions 
among the besieged, compromising loyalty to the community. Stasis and war fuel each other, 
make each other worse, and any competent commander in charge of a besieged city keeps the 
attackers in check while also watching his own back: Aineias knows that the most devastating 
blow may well come from the enemy within, not from the army outside: it is necessary to 
watch out for traitors, plotters, collaborators and people simply losing the trust and hope 
necessary for an effective defence. The Poliorketika therefore covers situations where it is 
wise to have the watchmen on the wall face outside as well as inside.
2
 
The Greek term stasis is often translated as ‘civil war’ or ‘civil strife’, modern terms 
which capture many of the more extreme phenomena which characterised stasis in the Greek 
city. The term ‘revolution’ is also commonly used, but is also more problematic, because its 
history, especially since the late eighteenth century, places it firmly within a concept of 
statehood and governance which is very different from an ancient polis community, and its 
applicability is in question.
3
 Losada employed the term ‘Fifth Column’ for cases of 
collaboration between inside plotters and an enemy outside, drawing on terminology which 
developed in the context of the Spanish Civil War.
4
 The collaboration between an outside 
aggressor and part of the besieged population, or perhaps just a few determined plotters, is 
only part of the ancient stasis phenomenon, but this aspect is particularly relevant to Aineias’ 
concerns. Ancient and modern commentators have also analysed these civic conflicts in terms 
of social class, as a contest between the interests of the wealthy few and the poor masses, a 
concern which is to an extent reflected in the Poliorketika.
5
  
Gehrke, in his comprehensive monograph on Stasis, prefers to adopt Eckstein’s term 
‘Internal War’ (‘Innerer Krieg’). This, too, conjures up ideas of physical fighting, and for my 
purposes in this chapter, I would like to draw the net a lot wider: stasis at its worst did indeed 
involve horrific violence, but that is just the most excessive expression of a wider 
phenomenon where community cohesion and basic solidarity with the polis disintegrate. 
Eckstein focuses on the deviation from generally agreed social norms; Gehrke develops this 
further, emphasising specifically the suspension of normally accepted rules of political 
disagreement, stepping outside the framework of constraints imposed by laws, social norms 
and customs.
6
 In the end, stasis primarily requires a number of people to decide that their 
own individual interests, or those of a specific interest group, are more important than – and 
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no longer coincide with – those of their polis and its community as a whole. In the ancient 
Greek world, this step constitutes a monumental transgression, the ultimate desperate and 
bold act, because one’s polis is not just the prime source of individual rights and status, but 
also the focus of a free man’s identity, based on history, relationship with the divine and a 
general sense of belonging. For the purpose of this chapter, I use the term stasis in this 
deliberately vague fashion, as a catch-all term for any action by citizens or inhabitants of 
Aineias’ besieged polis which suggest that they no longer see the defence of the city as the 
ultimate priority.  
Aineias is often mentioned in passing as an important source for tensions inside Greek 
cities in the fourth century, but there has in fact been little detailed analysis of his attitude to 
stasis as part of special studies of the phenomenon.
7
 The earliest scholar to discover Aineias 
as a source for conflict within ancient societies was Pöhlmann, who researched ancient 
‘communism’ and ‘socialism’ mainly to present an argument against such movements in his 
own time.
8
 Few ancient historians showed interest in tackling the question of stasis in a less 
politicised manner until Lehmann took up the question, culminating in a 1989 article 
specifically dealing with Aineias and the socio-political crisis of the polis.
9
 A year later, 
Whitehead’s introduction to his translation of the Poliorketika emphasised the importance of 
the topic, provided an overview of Aineias’ approach, and tried to defuse the question about 
Aineias’ own political leanings.10 For the purpose of this volume, it was thought that the topic 
warrants another detailed examination.
11
  
The two most comprehensive discussions of stasis dating from the Classical period 
are Thucydides’ account of the events in Korkyra in 427BC, and Aristotle’s treatise on the 
subject in book V of the Politics. Both accounts deserve attention in their own right, but here 
they are introduced briefly to provide some context for Aineias’ approach. Thucydides’ 
account of stasis in Korkyra
12
 remains the ultimate model of the disintegration of a Greek 
polis into horrific carnage: it describes a slippery slope from robust disputes between 
politicians of different factions through the law courts to the point where random killing and 
sacrilege is the order of the day, and part of the city centre is burned down. While this is 
going on, ships of interested outside powers are circling the island like vultures, occasionally 
prodding the two parties into further action, even when their action is ostensibly designed to 
calm things down. Later chapters demonstrate that this conflict dragged on for years and 
caused further trouble for the beleaguered Korkyraians. This is an extreme case, yet 
Thucydides deliberately sets it up as an exemplar for developments in his own time,
13
 
evoking images of extreme destruction in the reader’s mind each time the narrative reaches 
another case of stasis. Thucydides’ account is a classic in historical analysis as well as 
dramatic historiography, carried out with the diagnostic eye of a medic analysing the 
symptoms of a deadly disease.
14
 By comparison, Aineias is much more focused on the root 
causes of the phenomenon and on early prevention wherever possible: he tries to get to 
potential plotters before their actions become material for a dramatic historical account. 
Small, often mundane grievances, a wounded sense of pride, and quiet (but sometimes 
justified) desperation set off the disease even before its more dangerous symptoms develop; 
in a way, Aineias illustrates the beginnings of stasis before Thucydides’ dramatic events 
begin, even though he offers some warning examples of devastating consequences, too. 
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Where both authors agree is that disloyalty to the community and war are connected: they 
fuel each other, through desperation of those suffering aggression and defeat, through 
opportunism inside the city by the discontented, and through attempts of enemies on the 
outside to gain advantage by fomenting disputes among the besieged. While it is likely that 
Aineias knew Thucydides’ account,15 there is no evidence that the Poliorketika specifically 
aims to react to Thucydides’ Korkyra episode; but it responds to similar concerns which can 
only have grown in the decades which had passed since the Athenian historian had written his 
account.  
Aristotle’s Politics was probably written another two or three decades after Aineias’ 
work. Book V of the Politics
16
 is the longest ancient work dealing with stasis, but its main 
concern is not the exact process of internal conflict within a polis, but the more general 
mechanisms which cause constitutions to be challenged and overthrown.
17
 Aristotle hardly 
pays any attention to the role of external threats in destabilising polis societies, because he is 
interested in the inherent flaws of those systems. Aristotle and Aineias share the habit of 
illustrating general points with historical examples,
18
 and in both cases, the historical 
episodes used for this purpose also demonstrate aspects of the phenomenon which are not the 
main focus of the discussion. Their priorities, however, are almost opposites of each other: in 
the Politics, Aristotle tries to develop a general theory of how stasis arises on the basis of 
inherent flaws within a polis’s society and how it might be prevented;19 he investigates how 
different forms of government hold up to historical trends and flaws inherent in those 
systems, and how citizens’ desire for equality or personal power shapes states’ 
constitutions.
20
 While Aristotle acknowledges the complex multiplicity of causes for stasis, 
his main interest is constitutional theory; the historical examples do offer glimpses of specific 
grievances or events which trigger stasis,
21
 but even in that context, we rarely hear about the 
specific actions taken to overthrow a regime.
22
 Aineias’ focus seems almost the exact 
opposite of Aristotle’s: he emphasises the processes of civic disintegration and illustrates 
them with stories where occasionally ideological struggles, usually between oligarchs and 
democrats, become visible.
23
 It is important to appreciate that in both cases, the main line of 
discussion in the text represents the author’s priorities and ideas, while the examples 
demonstrate that both were perfectly aware of other factors, but did not deem them central to 
their main argument.  
The contrast between the discussion of stasis in the Politics and in the Poliorketika 
illustrates all too clearly how little interest Aineias has in constitutional details. He is wary of 
people who are unhappy with the political status quo, and it seems that the exact nature of the 
current government is a lot less important to him than doing everything in his power to avoid 
constitutional change at a time of external threat. Oligarchic and democratic states could have 
followed his advice equally, even though they might have found different aspects difficult to 
put into practice.
24
 Lehmann thinks that Aineias assumes a democratic structure which 
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ensures the loyalty of the poor:
25
 indeed, there is one passage which suggests to assign the 
ochlos, the masses, to guard certain public spaces,
26
 but otherwise the focus is on armed men, 
presumably hoplites, who would have had political rights in most oligarchic states as well.
27
 
In fact, some of the measures which curtail citizens’ freedoms may have been harder to 
reconcile with the ideals of democratic states.
28
  
Aineias’ generic city may be thought to have one of those moderate regimes 
somewhere close to the blurred boundary between oligarchy and democracy which were 
probably most common in the classical Greek world, but it does not matter much. The most 
generic government set-up which almost all poleis would have shared is apparently assumed: 
there are clearly multiple magistrates, archontes (ἄρχοντες, also a very generic term), some 
of whom seem to take on specific, even partly military functions, such as closing gates and 
commanding troops within the city.
29
 They also supervise or authorise various activities 
which need special attention during a crisis, such as family gatherings, imports and 
mercenaries.
30
 Aineias recommends that these leaders should have a bodyguard and avoid 
dangerous situations; indeed he offers examples where the assassination or capture of 
magistrates marked the beginning of a coup.
31
 Nevertheless, magistrates also need to be 
watched carefully, since there are other historical episodes where individuals holding high 
office use their position to overthrow the government or hand over the city to an enemy.
32
 
Aineias also refers to generals, stratēgoi (στρατηγοί); there are several, as one would expect, 
and they are clearly taking on the main military tasks, such as commanding and organising 
troops or supervising guard duties. It is possible that these generals are sometimes included 
when Aineias uses the more generic term archontes, since his instructions on securing the 
gates, where he particularly stresses the importance of clearly defined competences, refer to 
both archontes and stratēgoi fulfilling this duty, as if the terms could be used 
interchangeably.
33
 We can say for certain, however, that Aineias is describing a command 
structure and government setup which is heavily adapted to the crisis, so that the difference 
between the duties of civil and military officials seems to be blurred.
34
  
Apart from the military headquarters, the stratēgion, Aineias’ generic city is also 
expected to have a council building (bouleuterion) and a prytaneion.
35
 Most cities with 
democratic or oligarchic governments would have had a council (boulē), and an appropriate 
space for their meetings: a bouleuterion usually has seating for a few dozen up to a group in 
the low hundreds and space for somebody to address them. Prytaneia, usually mainly 
recorded as venues for public dining, were common even in cities which did not have 
magistrates of that name:
36
 the existence of such a building then tells us even less about a 
specific government set-up, but for Aineias, it is clearly a valuable venue to hold and monitor 
public gatherings. Aineias makes no reference to the activities of specific government bodies 
in these buildings: the council itself, as one of the central political institutions, is not 
mentioned at all; its role in decision making is either taken for granted or perhaps assumed to 
be suspended. Assemblies do not fare any better in the Poliorketika. Two historical examples 
feature a popular assembly, in one case as a means to mobilise people against an oligarchic 
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36
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plot,
37
 but in the other the oligarchs call an assembly to gather the people in one place where 
they and their leaders can easily be brought under control:
38
 as a verdict on the usefulness of 
assemblies in preserving a democratic status quo these examples produce a score draw. In 
Aineias’ generic city, we do not see the ekklēsia as a decision making body, either: in just one 
instance he advises to call an assembly, tellingly ‘an assembly of soldiers or citizens’39 which 
may suggest openness to oligarchic or democratic traditions in the community. This assembly 
is merely there to receive orders and information with the explicit expectation that the 
information will immediately be leaked to the enemy. We have to conclude, therefore, that 
Aineias would not have trusted an assembly with really important confidential information. 
Any assemblies of larger groups not sanctioned or ordered by the authorities are definitely 
considered a threat.
40
 In fact, some of the emergency measures put in place to keep the 
population in check resemble Aristotle’s methods of securing a tyranny.41 Aineias may be 
worried about people trying to upset the status quo, but in fact, the emergency itself makes 
standard government procedures almost entirely obsolete and gives all power to the 
commanding general and a group of officials.
42
 No wonder, perhaps, that the exact form of 
government in this besieged city matters little.  
Unlike Thucydides and Aristotle, Aineias never focuses on a theoretical assessment of 
stasis, but his worries about dissenters and what they might do in specific situations are a 
significant theme in the Poliorketika. We can discern from those many references what kind 
of processes the author had in mind, and what he considered to be their main causes. The 
term stasis (στάσις) never appears in the work, but a simulated internal conflict is described 
using the term stasiasmos (στασιασμός);43 a successful revolt of the oligarchs in Korkyra 
against the democracy is called epanastasis (ἐπανάστασις), and later in the chapter the 
leaders of the people are accused of the same act.
44
 More frequently, Aineias talks about 
plots, epiboulai (ἐπιβουλαὶ);45 one chapter (11) is in fact titled Epiboulai, although the 
chapter titles may not be Aineias’ own. Aineias usually thinks of such activities not in the 
abstract, but in terms of the people involved, for example those ‘standing up against’ the 
regime, antistasiōtai (ἀντιστασιώται), who appear twice, in examples from Argos and 
Herakleia,
46
 and, more frequently, plotters, epibouleuontes (ἐπιβουλεύοντες).47 We also 
encounter traitors, prodotai (προδόται), planning treason, prodosia (προδοσία), which 
specifically refers to handing over their city to the enemy.
48
 Sometimes these people are 
described more closely: Aineias is specifically worried about those who are unhappy with the 
status quo, and people who want change, ‘those who want the opposite of what is currently in 
place’.49 Another term commonly used in the Poliorketika is neōterizein (νεωτερίζειν),50 
literally ‘to make things new’ and ‘those who want to make things new’ (οἱ νεωτερίζειν 
βουλόμενοι).51 The term neōterizein and its cognates are generally used in classical Greek to 
describe the activities of people plotting to overthrow their state or constitution, but they also 
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imply a very specific motivation which, in this case, coincides with other passages where 
Aineias explains more clearly what motives he has in mind.  
What drives Aineias’ plotters to want a change of the status quo? We are used to 
thinking of stasis in political terms, efforts to change the political system, as discussed by 
Aristotle, or perhaps in Thucydides’ terms, where changes between oligarchy and democracy 
may also signify a shift in the alignment with one of the two great powers, Sparta or Athens. 
Aineias’ historical examples expose such motivations, but the Poliorketika is no theoretical 
treatise on stasis, and there is no aim to give a clear definition of the wider underlying 
reasons which drive citizens to do damage to their own community. Aineias leaves the 
background vague and focuses on the characters who might cause trouble, and with this more 
practical perspective, he may be providing a much better insight into general perceptions of 
stasis at the time. Much is merely implied or taken for granted: the author assumes that the 
contemporary reader will recognise some of the characters, mindsets and motivations he is 
describing.  
As we have seen, Aineias’ plotters are people who are not satisfied with the status 
quo, even if it is less clear what exactly this means: he may be talking about the government, 
but if the siege and the state of martial law he seems to be prescribing went on for some time, 
we have to assume that dissatisfaction would also increase because of those emergency 
measures. He is, in fact, expecting that some people will try to leave the city: men intending 
to become mercenaries and those wanting to sail out with a ship have to ask for permission 
from a magistrate, but there is no advice to deny all such requests on principle.
52
 Few cities 
would have been able to afford the loss of many men of fighting age, and Aineias is not just 
keen to prevent desertion during military engagements outside the walls, but he is also 
concerned with the general morale of his troops, most of whom, we should not forget, were 
essentially desperate amateurs.
53
 Anybody leaving the city was also a potential informer for 
the enemy, or might tell exiles that an opportunity for a return by force might arise.
54
  
Who are the people who might desert and or betray their native city in a crisis? 
Aineias suspects primarily those who have nothing to lose – men who do not have families or 
considerable property: for young men particularly, the outlook during a siege on their city 
would have been very bleak, and the incentives to leave would become greater as the threat 
of defeat grew. After all, it was not uncommon that after a city was taken, the victorious 
forces would kill all the men and sell all the women and children into slavery. Consequently, 
Aineias has most confidence in those who have something at stake in the community. He 
recommends that those parts of the city most at risk from attack should be guarded by the 
wealthiest and those with most prestige in the city because, as he says explicitly, 
remembering what they had to lose would make them most effective.
55
 This is spelled out 
even more clearly where Aineias describes his ideal gate keeper: in this position, where one 
man can do fatal damage to the whole community,
56
 he wants to see intelligent people 
capable of healthy suspicion, but first and foremost, he wants men who have families and 
property to protect.
57
 The emphasis on property and prestige comes across as a certain disdain 
for the poor, but these were indeed advantages which were most dependent on citizenship and 
therefore on the wellbeing of the community. A traitor might perhaps be lured with financial 
rewards or at least freedom and safety for himself and his family, but if his city was taken 
over by the enemy, or if he had to leave the city, it was highly unlikely that he would ever get 
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the chance to be a property owner or an eminent citizen again, even if he was still wealthy, 
since citizenship and the right to own property were closely guarded privileges and, in most 
poleis, almost impossible for outsiders to obtain.  
The worst candidates for gate keeping are, according to Aineias, men ‘who because of 
poverty or the pressure of obligations, or some other difficulties, may be persuaded to join an 
uprising (neōterismos) or instigate a plot themselves.’58 Debtors in particular represent a 
danger to community cohesion: in another passage, Aineias refers to the menace of men in 
dire straits sitting by and waiting for an opportunity.
59
 If the debt got out of hand, a debtor 
might indeed assume that upheaval in the city or even an invasion by an enemy could be a 
chance for a fresh start, provided they themselves managed to stay alive.
60
 To avoid some of 
these risks, Aineias recommends a reduction or abolition of debt interest, and, in extreme 
cases, he suggests to cancel debts altogether. Such a measure would of course cause damage 
to the creditors, and therefore might create even more discontent within the community. 
Aineias apparently had a solution to this problem, but unfortunately, he had already explained 
it in his lost work Poristikē.61 Perhaps his suggestion was similar to that for financing 
mercenaries, where the wealthy are required to provide money and upkeep at the moment, 
with a promise to get reimbursed with a tax reduction in the future.
62
 Food shortages are also 
a concern, which means that the community has to try its best to maintain supplies: Aineias 
suggests incentives for anybody managing to import food, and also recommends to provide 
the basic necessities for those who cannot afford them.
63
  
The first impression is almost inevitably that Aineias rates the rich as dependable and 
honourable and the poor as untrustworthy, an attitude that would not have been particularly 
unusual among Greek elites of the period.
64
 But in fact, the situation is more complex, 
because he also identifies the wealthy and influential as most likely to cause trouble within 
the city. We should not forget that people from a wealthier background might also find 
themselves in some of the desperate situations Aineias is so worried about, particularly debt. 
At the same time, if the most prominent people felt that their status or material interests were 
at stake, they were also the most likely to have the relevant means to trigger a coup, 
particularly clout, connections and executive experience within the city, as well as 
acquaintances abroad, which may include friends in the enemy camp.
65
 When Aineias 
suggests to get rid of some of those who ‘desire something different from the present 
situation’ he therefore singles out those with a history of leadership and political initiative.66 
Removing fairly prominent people could cause further trouble, so the advice is to find a 
pretext, for example an embassy or similar public mission abroad, which would get potential 
plotters out of town with their honour intact. Aineias includes three historical examples where 
the wealthy (or ‘the wealthy and oligarchic’, in one case) are staging a coup against a 
democratic regime;
67
 and we have already seen examples which showed magistrates involved 
in overthrowing a city’s government.68 Stories of democratic coups are more difficult to find, 
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except, perhaps, when Aineias talks about smuggling in weapons to arm those citizens who 
do not have their own, and there is a story of another group of conspirators who resorted to 
making shields and armour from wickerwork.
69
 But even there, we have to assume that the 
leaders and instigators of those plots are better situated, prominent men, and in one case, the 
leader of a coup is even smuggled into the city, together with the necessary weapons and 
armour.
70
 Thus, watching the activities of prominent citizens is a crucial aspect of avoiding 
stasis in Aineias’ city.   
While some plots can be carried out alone, for example by opening the gates or 
signalling to the enemy from the walls, an actual uprising in the city will need more support, 
which is why Aineias is so concerned with morale among his men and the desperation of the 
poor. Everybody in this besieged city is putting up with serious restrictions on their daily 
lives, and Aineias displays valuable insights into the psychology of his little community and 
some individuals within it. In particular, he describes personal motivations which seem petty 
in the grander scheme of things, but which represent desperate decisions of individuals trying 
to ensure their own survival or that of their family, even if it is against the interest of the 
whole community. What we get here are insights into activities which are never important 
enough for final historical narratives of great events, but which give us a better idea of the 
complexity of polis societies: the many viewpoints and interests hidden behind a polis label 
in a historical narrative, such as ‘stasis in Korkyra’ or ‘the Mitylenaians revolted’.  
In Aineias’ polis wounded pride is clearly a factor: we are a long way away from the 
great heroes of the Iliad, but here, too, anger about losing face is a crucial factor in sapping 
loyalty. Where historiography occasionally shows us prominent statesmen motivated by 
concerns about their personal honour, Aineias takes into account that such values and 
emotions might motivate every and any man in a polis, and potentially with devastating 
consequences. Thus, when morale is low, Aineias recommends to approach loudly when 
checking the watches, in order to spare the watchmen the embarrassment of being caught 
sleeping: there are situations when exacerbating disaffection and despondency is more 
dangerous than a few men napping on guard duty.
71
 Men who cannot be trusted are best not 
publicly confronted, but quietly removed from positions where they could do damage, and if 
possible in ways that could be considered a special honour: men who are under suspicion are 
therefore kept away from festivals by giving them the ‘privilege’ to celebrate the holiday at 
home.
72
 Fairness is also an issue: for example, the recommendation to make sure that watches 
are distributed fairly includes advice to reset the water clock at regular intervals to match the 
seasonal length of days and nights, and if we assume that Aineias is talking about a clock in a 
public place, he might also be thinking of a recurring public display of ensuring fairness.
73
 
Another dangerous example of putting personal interest first was people’s desperation 
to rescue personal belongings and particularly food supplies from outside the walls, even 
when the situation was already getting dangerous.
74
 Aineias makes allowances for evacuating 
slaves and animals in advance
75
, and for people engaging in last-moment harvesting while the 
enemy is approaching.
76
 The whole city’s food supply may depend on it, but this was also a 
matter of families worried about their own economic survival. The inhabitants of a Greek 
polis under attack could apparently be expected to respond by rushing out to the fields, on 
their own or in small groups, to rescue or defend their property. Aineias is worried that 
                                                 
69
 Ain. Tac. 29.4, 29.11-12. 
70
 Ain. Tac. 29.7-8, cf. Winterling 1993, 198. 
71
 Ain. Tac. 26.7-10. 
72
 Ain. Tac. 16-17; cf. 10.20. 
73
 Ain. Tac. 22.24-5; for problems of interpretation see Whitehead 1990, 158-60; on public water clocks see 
Armstrong and Camp 1977. 
74
 Ain. Tac. 10.1-3, 15.2, 16.2-3. 
75
 Ain. Tac. 10.1-2. 
76
 Ain. Tac. 7.1-2; cf. Xen. Hell. 7.5.14-17. 
people might get killed or perhaps captured, but he is also ready to respond to the people’s 
desire to confront the enemy by suggesting properly organised sorties.
77
 Nevertheless, all that 
is left outside, crops, stored supplies and installations which could be of use to the enemy, 
might have to be destroyed; as he suggests this, Aineias leaves it to the reader’s imagination 
how such measures might be received by the owners of those assets: perhaps he has already 
discussed these matters elsewhere.
78
 There is also a special concern for people whose family 
members were held as hostages in the enemy camp,
79
 accompanied by a hint that the enemy 
might well kill the hostages in view of the city.
80
 Rather than contemplating how to prevent 
such an atrocity, probably because at times it was unavoidable without surrender, Aineias 
goes about insulating relatives from the whole conflict, preferably by removing them from 
the city altogether while there is still a chance to do so. He seems resigned to the idea that 
hostages’ relatives might try something desperate to rescue their family members: the advice 
here shows a certain understanding for the terrible predicament such people would be in. It 
also explains more clearly why it was so important to prevent rash actions outside the walls 
which might allow the enemy to capture more prisoners. Yet again, other ancient sources talk 
about hostage-taking, but in Aineias, we see the effects on individuals and, through them, on 
the whole polis.  
This is where Aineias’ image of dissent within a polis differs most from both 
Thucydides and Aristotle’s ideas of stasis: in this generic city under siege, personal 
motivations matter, and these are often not (or certainly not predominantly) guided by 
considerations linked to greater political aims. Aineias is willing to accept some of these 
personal concerns as normal human behaviour rather than malicious intent, even if actions 
which can arise from such motives are presented as treacherous activities which need to be 
stopped or prevented. When the odds of survival become less favourable, individuals will re-
assess the balance between loyalty to their polis and their own personal interests. Aineias 
talks about homonoia, unity of purpose, in the community as the most important antidote to 
stasis. In our terms, what he describes is predominantly about confidence, namely the 
confidence of every member of the community that collaborating with the polis’s defence 
activities is a better bet to preserve the lives and livelihood of themselves and their families 
than any action they could take on their own, or with a group of dissenters.  
Aineias never provides us with a grand theory or narrative of how stasis happens: 
instead his work gathers many different scenarios and insights into the many forms 
destructive disloyalty might take in a polis under pressure, from small acts of sabotage to 
spectacular attacks which end in bloodshed and destruction. Not all of these could easily be 
defined as stasis, but what we see is a sliding scale of community cohesion failing under 
pressure, either when individuals lose the will to support their city’s defence or, more 
dangerously, when dissent or discontent fosters groups with common causes or grievances. 
Through his advice and some of the examples we get to see a few common scenarios 
Aineias has in mind at the more dangerous end of this scale, his idea of how a larger plot 
might turn into outright stasis. The most dangerous moments in a city’s life, apart from a 
direct attack by an enemy, are probably mass gatherings, particularly festivals. Such 
occasions may offer an excuse to bear arms, for example in a procession, or allow plotters to 
take control of arms which have to be left behind, insufficiently guarded, by some of the 
participants.
81
 At the same time, stasis by a large group of conspirators might best be 
prevented by mass gatherings, too, if those are made up of vigilant citizens and organised 
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properly to disperse the plotters and to deny them an opportunity to overpower the rest of the 
population.
82
 In any case, controlling any kind of gathering is a crucial task of the city 
officials,
83
 and open spaces within the city have to be secured to prevent large groups of 
people to come together on their own initiative.
84
 
Like most Greek poleis, Aineias’ generic city is probably not very big: the city’s force 
may number in the hundreds rather than in the thousands, so that Aineias has concerns about 
inviting mercenary forces which outnumber the local army.
85
 If mercenaries need to be hired, 
he suggests a highly decentralised system which will put no single citizen in control of more 
than two or three mercenaries at a time.
86
 But in a fairly small community, the balance of 
power between different interest groups might be shifted even just by arming locals who do 
not have armour themselves.
87
 All foreign visitors are automatically under suspicion, to the 
point where they are disarmed on entry and locked inside their inns during night time; even 
embassies are kept at arm’s length from all but carefully selected citizens.88 Aineias is 
probably mainly worried about communication with the enemy, which is to be restricted in 
various ways,
89
 but visitors might just add extra support to an internal plot, and at times, 
perhaps just an appropriate leader was needed, as in the example where a commander gets 
smuggled into a city together with additional weapons.
90
 
The most common form of disloyalty in the Poliorketika is collaborating with an 
enemy outside. Conflict within the community, a proper stasis, might lead one side to draw 
on the support of an enemy outside the walls, but the major concern for Aineias is that a 
single individual with grievances and an opportunity can do immense damage to the whole 
polis. People who plot in groups can be detected and obstructed in various ways, but one 
desperate man hoping to improve his fortunes when the city is taken is a lot more difficult to 
detect. Here is yet another issue where where Aineias’ attention to individuals and their 
grievances and selfish calculations plays a crucial role. Every man in the city, including the 
slaves,
91
 could be instrumental in a plot with the enemy. It is worth adding that Aineias 
perhaps misses a trick when he never even contemplates the idea that women, too, might be 
potential traitors who collaborate with the enemy. Women do turn up as potential 
messengers,
92
 as part of the cast of various stratagems
93
 and, of course, as potential victims 
who defend their houses by throwing roof tiles;
94
 nevertheless, in the Poliorketika, they are 
part of men’s plots, but not suspected of being plotters themselves. The sheer size of the main 
chapters dealing with individual traitors, especially 18-20 and 31, the large number of 
examples dealing especially with treacherous gate keepers and attempts to communicate with 
the enemy, shows the importance of the dangers of individual men’s disloyalty; cautious tales 
about such behaviour are presented across the whole work, and include all sorts of offenders 
and opportunities. The main message is that it takes one man who is desperate, angry or 
frightened enough to take an opportunity as it arises to take down the whole city. With an 
enemy waiting outside the walls, an individual’s disloyalty might be just as dangerous as a 
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full stasis trying to overthrow the status quo. Aineias’ attention to the concerns of individuals 
is therefore crucial to his project.  
Homonoia – a common purpose – and the ability to keep calm and organised under 
pressure are Aineias’ best defence against defeat. This kind of community cohesion might 
still save the city even when the enemy is already within the walls. The best example for this 
is an episode from Plataia, where the Thebans are already in control of the city, but the locals 
work together, breaking through walls of houses and using local resources and superior 
knowledge of the urban topography to overcome the intruders.
95
 In such a situation, panic and 
confusion are especially dangerous, particularly if the defenders cannot tell friend from foe. 
Plotters might actually try to bring about a panic, pretending that an attack has already 
happened, in order to help the enemy take the city.
96
 Good preparation, sufficient motivation 
and, most of all, a well-ordered community are key to overcome the most perilous stage of an 
invasion, when the fight comes down to defending the city itself, street by street.
97
 These are 
also the situations where traitors can do the most damage, if they have already made common 
cause with the enemy.  
In summary, a whole range of human behaviour is on display in the Poliorketika. 
Aineias covers deliberate acts of sedition as well as stupidity or selfishness with unintended 
disastrous consequences, and he takes the potential dangers of both seriously. Planned 
treachery requires some kind of motivation, from discontent and anger to desperation or self-
interest. Combined with the means to carry out a plan, disloyal sentiments can become 
dangerous as supporters are identified, communications opened, and manpower or equipment 
secured. Finally, the pivotal point is reached when an opportunity arises: a chance might be 
easily available as part of the daily routine of the city, but, with a vigilant commander in 
charge, those dangers might be reduced to a minimum. Aineias offers examples where 
specific motivations are mentioned, but the actual reason for sedition matters less to him than 
efforts to restrict access to means and opportunities which could facilitate a plot. At the same 
time, he emphasises the importance of keeping any kind of discontent among the population 
to a minimum, as far as that is even possible in a community under severe stress.  
Aineias’ main weapon against stasis and treason is homonoia,98 community cohesion, 
particularly, if it is founded on a confidence in the ability of the polis to guarantee the safety 
its residents. Many problems do not even arise if the people are willing to follow the 
leadership, and agree on what needs to be done and what sacrifices might be necessary to 
ensure the community’s wellbeing. But this ultimate community asset cannot be taken for 
granted. At times, securing homonoia might entail a balancing act, catering to the needs of 
interest groups whose concerns might be contradictory, e.g. debtors and lenders, or more 
generally the wealthy and the poor.
99
 
For Aineias’ purposes, the most important resource are all inhabitants who agree that 
security lies in the preservation of the status quo, those who are willing to work together to 
defend the city, and he assumes that the mass of people can be relied upon to stop a coup.
100
 
He counts on decent, experienced men with families to defend, people respected by their 
neighbours and ready to comply with requests from magistrates and commanders.
101
 In 
addition, the community needs order, and in a crisis this can include special measures citizens 
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might not tolerate in peace time.
102
 Finally, morale is essential: if too many citizens lose hope 
or assume that the current regime will not be able to save their lives or livelihoods, homonoia 
is unlikely to survive, and neither is the city.  
What makes Aineias’ work so valuable is that he analyses important aspects of Greek 
politics and conflict in the context of community life, where individuals and their concerns 
matter: surviving under siege depends on getting the best out of people. A whole range of 
damaging behaviours, from individual acts of disloyalty to violent factional strife, are linked 
to a complex set of human calculations and emotions which do matter especially in smaller 
poleis where the actions and personal networks of almost any individual can make a 
difference. In this context, stasis begins to look like a fact of polis life – something that can 
grow, under pressure, out of the perfectly normal attempts of human beings to look after their 
personal advantage. Under normal circumstances, it might be expected that most people’s 
interests coincide with the wellbeing of the community, but Aineias demonstrates how this 
situation can shift for some, and he grapples with ways in which loyalty can be maintained, 
restored or, if necessary, enforced with increased vigilance. In Aineias’ small city under 
siege, it is not philosophical differences about constitutions or the strategic interests of the 
great power blocks which are the main triggers of stasis. In this respect, Aineias’ view of 
stasis, even if we have to piece it together from different passages in his work, is a very 
valuable addition to those other discussions of internal strife which survive from the Classical 
period, particularly Thucydides and Aristotle. In the Poliorketika, we get a chance to look at 
the failing of homonoia from the ground up, encountering a level of polis life where the 
political is intensely personal. 
Bibliography 
Armstrong, J.E, and Camp, J.M. (1977) ‘Notes on a Water Clock in the Athenian Agora’, 
Hesperia 46: 147-61. 
Eckstein, H. (1964) Internal War. Problems and Approaches. Free Press: New York. 
_________ (1965) ‘On the Etiology of Internal Wars’, History and Theory 4: 133-63. 
Fuks, A. (1971) ‘Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra’, American Journal of Philology 92: 
48-55. 
_________ (1974) ‘Pattern and Types of Social-Economic Revolution in Greece from the 
Fourth to the Second Century BC’, Ancient Society 5: 51-81. 
_________ (1979-80) ‘Τοῖς ἀπορουμένοις κοινωνεῖν. The Sharing of Property by the Rich 
with the Poor in Greek Theory and Practice’, Scripta Classica Israelica 5: 46-55. 
Gehrke, H.-J. (1985) Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen 
Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Beck, Munich. 
Hornblower, S. (1991) A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. I: Books I-III. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford.  
Kalimtzis, K. (2000) Aristotle and Political Enmity and Disease. An Inquiry Into Stasis. State 
University of NY Press, Albany. 88-137. 
Lehmann, G.A. (1970) ‘Dion and Herakleides’, Historia 19: 401-6. 
_________ (1980) ‘Krise and innere Bedrohung der hellenischen Polis bei Aeneas Tacticus’, 
in Eck, W., Galsterer, H., Wolff, H. (eds), Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. 
Festschrift für F. Vittinghoff. Böhlau, Cologne and Vienna. 71-86. 
_________ (1989) ‘Aeneas Tacticus und die politisch-soziale Krise der zeitgenössischen 
Polis-Welt: Einige kritische Anmerkungen’, Index 17: 105-15. 
                                                 
102
 Chapter 10 in particular lists a whole range of security measures which look like measures to introduce a 
kind of martial law to the city, disrupting normal life in a number of ways.  
Lintott, A. (1982) Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City. Croom Helm, 
London and Canberra. 
Lonis, R. (1996) ‘Poliorcétique et stasis dans la première moitié du IVe siècle av. J.-C.’, in 
Carlier, P. (ed.) Le IVe siècle av. J.-C. Approches Historiographiques. De Boccard, 
Paris. 241-57. 
Losada, L.A. (1972) The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War. Brill, Leiden. 
McLeod, C.W. (1979) ‘Thucydides on Faction (3.82-83)’, Proceedings of the Cambridge 
Philological Society 25: 52-68. 
Miller, S.G (1978) The Prytaneion: its Function and Architectural Form. University of 
California Press, Berkeley. 
Mulgan, R.G. (1991) ‘Aristotle’s Analysis of Oligarchy and Democracy’, in Keyt, D and 
Miller, F.D. (eds), A Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Blackwells, Oxford. 307-22. 
Pöhlmann, R.v. (1893-1901) Geschichte des antiken Sozialismus und Kommunismus. Beck, 
Munich. 
Polansky, R. (1991) ‘Aristotle on Political Change’, in Keyt, D and Miller, F.D. (eds), A 
Companion to Aristotle’s Politics. Blackwells, Oxford. 323-45. 
Ste Croix, G.E.M. de (1981) The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. Duckworth, 
London. 
Todd, S. (1990) ‘Lady Chatterley's Lover and the Attic Orators: The Social Composition of 
the Athenian Jury’, Journal of Hellenic Studies 110: 146-73. 
van Wees, Hans (2008) ‘Stasis, Destroyer of Men: Mass, Elite, Political Violence and 
Security in Archaic Greece’, in Brélaz, C. and Ducrey, P. (eds), Sécurité collective et 
ordre public dans les sociétés anciennes. Fondation Hardt, Geneva. 1-48. 
Weed, R.L. (2007) Aristotle on Stasis: A Moral Psychology of Political Conflict. Logos 
Verlag, Berlin. 
Whitehead, D. (1990) Aineias the Tactician, How to Survive under Siege. Translated with 
Introduction and Commentary. Clarendon Ancient History Series, Oxford. 
Winterling, A. (1993) ‘Arme und Reiche. Die Struktur der griechischen Polisgesellschaften in 
Aristoteles’ Politik’, Saeculum 44: 179-205. 
 
